|
Case à Palabres du BDP-Gabon Nouveau
newsman
Membre doyen
Auteur de: 25 messages sur ce forum, Evaluez ce membre |
18-juin-00, 23h04 (Heure de: New Jersey) |
    |
"Media et Democratisation au Gabon: Une analyse politique"
| |
Voici une splendide analyse de la place des media dans le systeme Bongoiste. Cette analyse est d'un europeen qui a sejourne au Gabon. Je l'ai trouve en bibliotheque en faisant une recherche sur les media du Gabon. Le texte original est en Anglais et la traduction en Francais est rendue difficile par la longueur de cette analyse (10 pages). Si vous ne lisez pas l'Anglais, c'est domage car cette analyse est superbe. Bonne lecture Media and democratisation in Gabon: a political analysis
Leo van Audenhove SUMMARY
The introduction of the new democratic constitution in Gabon after the National Conference in 1990 opens new possibilities for the creation of independent media. In the area of the press in particular, a lot of new titles appear. Although it could be expected that these titles should be affiliated primarily with the opposition, towards the end of 1993 most of the newspapers are financed and controlled either directly by the regime or by former top ranking officials. In this article we show that there is a strong link between the specific characteristics of the Gabonese media and the basic characteristic of the underlying political system: that access to political positions leads to access to economic accumulation. The period between 1990 and 1993 was a period of struggle for power between different democratic and non-democratic groups. As these groups are not supported by large segments of the population the fight for media and access to the media is hard, as this is the only way to reach their potential following.
1 INTRODUCTION AND JUSTIFICATION
At the end of the eighties and the beginning of the nineties a number of African countries initiated democratic reforms. These changes were brought about by several external factors of which the end of the East-West conflicts and the subsequent process of democratisation in Eastern Europe are not to be underestimated. But a number of internal factors were also operating, two of them being the loss of legitimacy of the African authoritarian states and the economic crisis as a breeding ground for the democratic movement on the African continent.
One of the most apparent effects of the democratisation in Africa is the explosive growth of the press. Whereas previously only a few newspapers were published in most African countries -- almost without exception committed to the regime -- dozens of new titles appeared at the beginning of the nineties. Although these papers are considered part of a new free press, they are not always as free as one might think. They are part of a specific political system in which different factions fight over state power, always bearing in mind that access to state power in a Central African context means access to economic accumulation through corruption. Democratisation in these countries can then be seen as a reintegration of certain elite factions, previously excluded from power and thus economic accumulation, without the broader majority of society obtaining real participation.
In the case study on Gabon we tried to examine the characteristics of the democratisation process and those of the media. In this process, the political system and the media are very hard to separate. Therefore we analyse them from a much wider standpoint, which includes the media and the political system as well as the economic system. Moreover, we reset the developments in their historical context, since certain characteristics of the former system continue to affect the present more democratic system.
Although this study treats very little theory as such it is theoretically founded on a school of thought designated as neo-patrimonialism. This movement, represented in France by authors such as Médard and Bayart, is not based on the obscurantism of the old African studies but on modern concepts from anthropology, political science and sociology. Their analyses are particularly centred on internal factors, to fit into broader universal processes afterwards.
We ground the empirical part of our study on: an extensive study of literature consisting mainly of unpublished doctoral studies from Gabonese students and scholars; 25 interviews taken at Libreville in August and September 1993; numerous informal conversations; and on elaborate texts and texts of law, all collected on the spot. In many cases it was very difficult to obtain reliable information and to evaluate it. We adopted the principle of not mentioning any facts which did not have at least two trustworthy corroborations. Since a lot of material has been obtained on an informal basis, we find it very difficult to refer to our sources. For this we ask the reader's understanding. Further information may be obtained from the author.
2 THE BONGO SYSTEM: THE GOLDEN YEARS 1973--1985
2.1 The political system
On 13 August 1960 Gabon officially became independent. The country adopted a democratic constitution after the French model, with strong presidential power, although with only one chamber of representatives. The democratic structures did not last long. Like most African countries Gabon was hardly prepared for independence. Its leaders were more interested in taking over the established authoritarian colonial structures than in drastically reforming them. Leon Mba, the first freely elected president, attempted to restrict the power of parliament as soon as he took office (Gaulme 1988:138; N'Sole Bitheghe 1990:43), without realising his dream of a one-party state. His successor Albert Bernard Bongo, 1 who took office in 1968, made short work of the parliamentary democracy and transformed Gabon into a single-party state with the Parti Démocratique Gabonais as the only political party.
Bongo's regime can be described as neo-patrimonialistic 2 and shows remarkable stability compared to similar African regimes. This regime is characterised by a strong personification of power, based on a political and political-economic clientelistic network. The members of the political network, including prominent members of the government and the party executive, are kept in a permanent state of insecurity by a constant threat of dismissal or reappointment. The people involved hardly oppose this state of affairs, in exchange for huge compensations -- even when they do not hold the position any longer -- and the possibilities of corruption. The most important positions of power, however, such as the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Finance, are reserved for the closest confidants and relatives of the President. Therefore the separation between private and public domains is practically non-existent. In the sphere of internal politics, Bongo, as President and Secretary-General, holds complete control. The role of Parliament and the Central Committee is mainly symbolic (Barnes 1992:50). The Parti Démocratique Gabonais, founded in the name of the ideology of National Unity, serves the purpose of lending some legitimacy to Bongo's personal power. Even so the personification of power is not complete. As Bayart points out, all African dictators have to confront balances of power and cultural, social and economic obstacles which restrict their personal projects (Bayart 1991b:221).
Power is always the result of a struggle between competing factions. The trick is to divide the factions in order to rule more easily and to secure support without running risks (Bayart 1991b:224). Since independence the consecutive Gabonese governments have always taken into account ethnic and regional balances based upon a subjective estimation of the weight of a certain group (Gaulme 1988:39; Gaulme 1991:54; Rossatanga-Rignault 1993c:241). Bongo, himself coming from a small ethnic group, always managed to keep a subtle ethnic balance within the government and the higher civil service. On lower levels the system is controlled by a clientelistic system based upon ethnicity and provincialism (Rossatanga-Rignault 1993c:243--244).
A second network was set up by the Clan des Gabonais, with representatives from forestry, the oil industry (Elf-Aquitaine), the Gabonese and French business world, French politics and French administration. Bongo, as head of this Clan, can count on political and financial support from the Clan itself and from overseas in exchange for import and export licences, monopolies and certain favours (Péan 1983:21). Together with the Clan, the political elite controls the economic key-sectors and the country's import and export channels which are important to the accumulation of the economic capital and necessary to maintain the neo-patrimonialistic system. All important activities are liable to substantial advance levies by the regime (Péan 1983:103--107).
To a great extent, the remarkable stability of the system has its origins in the immense revenues derived from the oil the country had at its disposal between 1973 and 1985. During this period oil alone constituted 55 to 65 per cent of the national income (Pochon 1991:3176). The GNP per head of the population ranks among the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Even though these revenues are divided unequally and the gap between the few rich and the masses of poor is poignant, a middle class has formed which we find nowhere else in French-speaking Africa (Gaulme 1988:152).
However, the stability of the system cannot be explained merely by economics. As Médard points out, the personification of power and the lack of institutionalisation result in the reigning of the arbitrarian and a trend towards the authoritarian (Médard 1991c:342). But unlike Mba's politics and unlike many other African leaders, Bongo's politics are moderately authoritarian,3 carrying the motto of national reconciliation. This policy of amnesty and reconciliation is based on a permanent economic redistribution and political co-optation, all of which is made possible by the growing economic prosperity of the country (Barnes 1992:48--49). The reintegration of dissidents by offering them high administrative positions is the main characteristic of the Gabonese regime, repressive measures usually being taken as a last resort. The army and the police play hardly any part in this. Bongo's repressive power is founded on his Garde Présidentielle (GP). Together with the security forces, this GP -- 1 900 men strong and equipped with advanced weapons -- constitutes a feared means of power. They regularly run in, torture or murder opponents (Péan 1983:155--156).
2.2 The media and the Bongo system
Bearing the rather sparse population in mind, Gabon had one of the most extensive media systems in central Africa by the end of the eighties. Since its independence, the country has made use of a radio service started in 1959. Shortly after independence the first television station was founded in 1963. From then on television and radio were administrated by the Radio Télévision Gabonaise (RTG) which in its turn came under the Minister of Information. From 1965 great efforts were taken to develop the technical structures and to extend the transmission range. A channel was added to radio and television in 1977 and 1978 respectively. In 1986 the first private television station was set up and after a time was taken over by the pay television, TV Sat. This pay TV transmits its own two commercial channels through coded microwaves and in addition offers TV 5 Europe, CNN International, the BBC and BoP TV. Besides the media with a national range, there is also the international radiotransmitter Africa N81, created in 1981. This semi-commercial station can be received throughout Africa and has 14 million regular listeners.
Unlike the audiovisual sector the development of the press has been a lot less successful. Not until 1975 did the first newspaper L'Union come from the printing press. The paper is available in the big cities. It reached a circulation of 15 000 to 18 000 copies by the end of the eighties.
Under the Bongo system all media are subordinate to the regime. The control and influence the regime has over the media affect a number of areas which are hard to separate and which complement each other. As in politics the different levels merge into one another, from administrative control into repressive control. The following discussion illustrates a distinction between the administrative, the neo-patrimonialistic and the dictatorial level.
The first way of influencing appears on the administrative level through the directors of the institution, who are appointed in accordance with their political commitment (Mbourou 1978:4). Answering directly to the Minister of Information and the President, the Directeurs de l'Information and the Ministry do not hesitate to check journalists' texts directly and to take action where they think necessary (Moussirou-Mouyama 1981:38). Internal circulars indicate which information has to be suppressed or has to be dealt with discreetly (Reteno N'Diaye 1983:43). More generally, on party level, a commission with the assignment to watch over the tenor of the contents is added to each service (Sabi-Djaboudi 1992b:82). Yet for a long time now this form of censorship has by no means been the most important. Since journalists cannot write anything which does not meet with the approval of their superiors (Mbourou 1978:36), dissident information is already concealed or suppressed on the lowest level. So political control of the contents is exercised mainly through the omnipresent self-censorship (Moussirou-Mouyama 1981:38; Reteno N'Diaye 1983:43).
Those who do not write what is expected of them are dismissed, transferred to another administration or promoted to positions in which they are less harmful (Koumba 1992:60). Because of this, the career of the individual is strongly related to his political flexibility. Journalists are well aware of their chances of promotion to higher administrative and political positions such as press attaché, public relations officer or Conseiller of the President's entourage (Ekekang 1985:142). Many journalists regard their work for the press, radio or television as a stepping-stone to the Valhalla of the top-ranking officials.
A second form of influencing is founded on what can be called the patrimonialistic level. The selection of officials is made not only according to their competence but in terms of their political adjustment to the regime. This kind of selection exists on all levels, from the granting of scholarships to the appointment of managerial officials. As soon as an ordinary journalist has reached an administrative position the written and unwritten rules attached to the position prevail. This shows how the administrative institutionalisation within the media has penetrated deeply. Although those rules have a censoring effect, the journalist is not subject to the arbitrariness of his superior. These rules do not apply to the top of the different media. As Tudesq states, executive positions within the media are very unstable in most African countries and a number of professionals rotate from one executive post to another (Tudesq 1992:100). This is also the case within the Gabonese context.
As he does in the governmental field, Bongo secures his power within the media by cultivating insecurity and dependence, by creating, eliminating or removing executives and directors. Top-ranking executives can be dismissed from one day to the next, when the President is no longer pleased with them; nevertheless, they always stay in the public service (Ndong Ngoua 1992:96). In this way the director-general of RTG as well as the director-general of RTG television were replaced after the National Conference. In 1988 the unfortunate Paul Mbadinga, editor in chief of the state newspaper, was fired after a critical editorial directed at the then Minister of Defence, a close relative of the President. Even so, Mbadinga was never struck from the list of the Fonction Publique (Ndong Ngoua 1992:96--97). In the summer of 1993 Paul Mbadinga became Conseiller of the Prime Minister.
A characteristic of neo-patrimonialism is also the permanent integration and co-option of the opposition into the regime by offering jobs and bribes. As stated above, this constitutes an important part of the political game in Gabon. This co-option happens constantly within the media. The price is high for promoting the freedom of the press when it comes to finding a new job (Sabi-Djaboudi 1992b:18). Even the toughest critics find their way into the system. John Joseph Mbourou and Vincent Mavoungou, who both wrote critical dissertations during their studies in France, have since been co-opted into the system. John Joseph Mbourou is Directeur d'Information with the international radio station Africa N81 and acquits himself fairly well in his task as gatekeeper. Vincent Mavoungou became Conseiller du President. At an interview Prof André-Jean Tudesq4 stated that the more critical Gabonese students are during their student years, the faster they push through to important positions when they return to their country.5 Besides reintegrating them, the political leaders also try to placate journalists by adding an occasional little bonus to their meagre pay.
Nevertheless, it turns out that administrative control and co-option of troublesome elements are not always sufficient. In Gabon journalists have been imprisoned and mur$ered (Koumba 1992:60). Samuel Nguema M'Ba, editor in chief of the official newspaper L'Union, Fran.ois Ondo-Edou, head of the national radio and Jean-Baptiste Asse Bekale, a radio reporter, were arrested and incarcerated in 1981 (Reed 1987:31) for broadcasting an interview with the leaders of the country's opposition group, the Mouvement du Rassemblement National, on the international radio station Africa N81. The journalists were released in July 1985 after having made their public excuses to the President. They were immediately reintegrated into the public administration (Ndong Ngoua 1992:97).
It is quite obvious that this kind of control has considerable impact on the contents of the state media, particularly on the information. Censorship and self-censorship favour the official view and suppress or distort all non-conformist elements. Only flattering and positive actions are reported. Generally they are all about festivities, presidential audiences, inaugurations, presentations of medals, etc. Strikes, riots, insurrection, social dissatisfaction, in short anything that could harm the regime, are suppressed, minimised or their subversive nature strongly emphasised (Sabi-Djaboudi 1992b:79). The personification of the power we see on a political level also manifests itself in and exploits the media (Mavoungou 1986:4). The propaganda organised by the single party is concentrated on the person of the President and is intended to credit him with the social accomplishments (Mavoungou 1986:261). At their inauguration new structures are presented as personal donations from the President in order to stress his generosity (Mavoungou 1986:55). In all the media, and particularly on television, the President is the centre of information.
From the end of the seventies onwards the apparent dysfunctional contents of certain programmes have been striking. Makaya in the official paper L'Union, Les Dossier de la RTG on television, and Le Patriote, a periodical edited by the President's entourage all criticised abuses in Gabonese society and politics. Severe criticism was directed against officials, ministers, and public or bureaucratic abuses. What is more, a number of ministers had to resign as a result of certain disclosures and questions asked by the public during a broadcast of Les Dossiers de la RTG. Although certain authors see this as a manifestation of the freedom of the press and freedom of speech (Zihou ihou 1985:85), most of them agree that this freedom is only a deception (Mavoungou 1986:262--263; Sabi-Djaboudi 1992:107; Péan 1983:135). In a Machiavellian game, politicians are sacrificed to the prestige and the credibility of the head of state who is above all criticism, as are his close relatives and his entourage (Sabi-Djaboudi 1992b:107). The apparently dysfunctional contents serve a double purpose. For one thing they work as a kind of safety valve to content the people, for another they reinforce the minister's dependence on the President.
3 THE DEMOCRATISATION
3.1 The democratisation and the new political system
The factors which played a part in the democratisation process in Africa are various and their respective importance is difficult to assess.
An important underlying cause and catalyst of the Gabonese democratisation movement is to be found in the financial crisis the country went through from 1985 onward. That year the tide turned on the world oil market and oil prices dropped in a spectacular way. Within a short time, Gabon was confronted with the instalments for the billion loans contracted between 1980 and 1985 to finish the megalomaniac railway project Le Transgabonais (Rousseau 1993:2831--2835). In 1987 the IMF had to intervene and enforced a structural adjustment program (SAP). This was the beginning of a process of increasing control of the public finances and a setback for the civil service salary, which constituted a major cause of growing social dissatisfaction (Bonnet 1991:23).
The austerity measures of both the IMF and the Bongo government led to the first strikes among the civil servants in 1988 (Englebert 1993:359). The President decided that from then on economic measures would be implemented only if they did not undermine social and political instability. By the end of 1989, however, a new strike wave broke out and spread to the entire public sector and to the educational sector. At first strikers put forward a list of financial demands (Bonnet 1991:71). According to Bonnet, however, the dissatisfaction should not be reduced to mere wage claims and social demands. At this stage there was already political dissatisfaction that went much further (Bonnet 1991:23).
Even so, at the start nothing indicated that the strikes would result in the multi-party system. After the granting of the students' demands, the strike in this sector even came to a complete stop (Bonnet 1991:81). Only during the following strikes did a number of intellectuals channel the protest towards democratic demands (Rossatanga-Rignault 1993b: 57). The Mouvement de Redressement National (MORENA) certainly played an important part in this. Founded in 1981 and long paralysed by internal struggles it resumed its underground propaganda early in 1989 (Englebert 1933:359) thereby enforcing its demand of a multi-party system.
In February and March 1990 persistent protests resulted in an important political concession, the creation of a National Conference (NC) whose assignment was to draw up the statutes for a new single party: the Rassemblement Social Démocratique Gabonais (RSDG) which was supposed to unite the PDG and the MORENA. But the MORENA refused to ratify the NC and RSDG notions and eventually voted for the multi-party system and the calling of new elections, but maintaining the presidential office mandate.
Unlike the National Conferences in other African countries, the Gabonese NC has no sovereign power and can only formulate motions. Although the outcome of the NC is not matched with Bongo's initial RSDG motions, the regime and its President in particular retain most of their power (Bonnet 1991:163; Kombila-Iboanga 1991:274). In fact, the Gabonese NC is a compromisely between the existing elite group and a politically conscious but left-out elite, for whom the transition to a political multi-party market is a legitimate means of gaining access to the system (Kombila-Iboanga 1991:274). Bongo's lasting political power is clearly shown by the elections of 16 and 23 September, when the PDG won -- fraudulently or not -- 63 seats out of 120. The remaining seats were divided among a large number of opposition parties. Bongo's control over key economic sectors, based on connections with the Clan, remained virtually untouched.
In the social sphere, the period between the parliamentary election of 1990 and the presidential election of December 1993 was characterised by the continuation of social dissatisfaction and the escalation of the economic crisis, of which strikes of all sorts were the expression. On the political level, the opposition as well as President Bongo prepared themselves for the presidential election. Because of his majority in Parliament, Bongo was able to block all too drastic changes. The influence of the opposition on the government's policy continued to be very limited.
By the end of 1990, the opposition itself consisted of more than 38 political parties. The most important opposition parties were the Rassemblement National des Bûcherons RNB (previously MORENA), the MORENA-Original (branched off the former MORENA) and the Parti Gabonais Progressiste PGP. In addition to these three big opposition factions, there were numerous small political groups and a number of parties built around one or a few persons, usually former top people of the regime (see table), who tri%d to re-enter the system through democratic elections. As Médard pointed out, if access to the state was the condition for acquiring wealth in a first phase, in a second phase -- and particularly when democratic methods were adopted -- wealth became a conditio sine qua non for access to power (Médard, 1991c: 346).
One of the parties' problems seems to be their firm establishment within society. Gabonese parties compete for the electorate's favour from above. There is no question of popular parties supported by large segments of the population. Only the RNB and the MORENA have a larger permanent support among the administrative urban middle class. Still, it is positive in the Gabonese context that there are no ethnic parties in the narrow sense of the word. Although the electoral implantation of the parties corresponds largely with the ethnic or regional origin of the political leader, nearly all parties receive votes in other parts of the country (Rossatanga-Rignault 1993a: 118--120). Moreover, the strategies for acquiring the power are based upon ethnic regional alliances and the party officials are selected on a geopolitical basis, even in those parties which officially reject ethnism (Rossatanga-Rignault 1993c:247). Even though the everyday political debate is mostly about ethnicity, the parties profess nationalism, multi-ethnism or a certain ideology and not ethnism (Rossatanga-Rignault 1993a:117).
On 5 December 1993 Omar Bongo won the presidential elections by 51,18 per cent of the votes, while his chief opponent, Pére Mba Abésolle, obtained a mere 27 per cent. The opposition did not accept the results and accused President Bongo of fraud. According to Joseph John-Nambo, the explanation of Bongo's electoral victory was to be found in the period before the elections, when no stone was left unturned to direct the elections (John-Nambo 1993:133). Thus, the electoral law, voted exclusively by the PDG, did not guarantee a smooth proceeding, the support of the European Community was refused and fraud was deliberately committed in drawing up the register of voters and distributing the electoral cards (John-Nambo 1993:133--139). On the other hand, it should be pointed out that a number of factors were advantageous to the President. For instance, he could count on a solid party organisation, he still had a large following in the isolated inland, and he took a stand against a shattered opposition. Furthermore, Bongo came from a small ethnic group, unlike Pére Mba Abésolle who belonged to the dominant Fang. This may have turned out in Bongo's favour with the other ethnic groups (Rousseau 1993:2823). Whether the elections were fraudulent and particularly whether this has been the key to Bongo's victory, is still hard to say so many months afterwards. The fact remains that because of this, the democratisation of Gabon has been postponed indefinitely.
3.2 The constitution and the new institutions regarding the media
The new constitution, voted by the Gabonese Parliament in March 1991, did not result directly from the 1990 National Conference NC, since it has no sovereign power. The NC can only propose amendments to the constitution, as a result of which the final constitution deviates considerably from the NC proposals on several points (Kombila-Iboanga 1991: 278). For example, the NC proposed to assign a permanent character to the institution which has to evaluate and judge the process of democratisation every year. No trace of this stipulation can be found in the final constitution.
In general one can state that the constitution remains rather vague in many places. Unfortunately the basic human rights, including a number of stipulations about communication, are defined too generally, giving way to broad interpretations. Article 95 about communication illustrates this very well. The article set up an independent organ, the Conseil National de la Communication, that should watch over the application and the observation of several broadly specified regulations (Loi N83/91, 95). The CNC was empowered to control the expression of democracy in the entire territory, to control the contents and statutes of the media. Above all, the CNC was given preliminary legislative power. But the stipulations are vague, not further developed and lack all coherence, again allowing for several interpretations. On the precise power of the organ, the constitution only states in Art 102 that an organic law should further regulate the organisation of the CNC (Loi N83/91, 102). In other words, the constitution sets up a control organ, defines its composition, but does not assign it any real power.
The organic law required in Art 102 was passed on 24 March 1992, one year after the constitution. Th |
|
|
Alerte | IP |
Format d'impression | Modifier |
Répondre |
Répondre avec citation | Haut |
|
|
newsman
Membre doyen
Auteur de: 25 messages sur ce forum, Evaluez ce membre |
19-juin-00, 18h53 (Heure de: New Jersey) |
|
|
1. "RE: Media et Democratisation au Gabon: Une analyse politique"
En réponse au message #0
| |
Le message original ayant ete atrophie sur la fin, je vous ici en donne la suite manquante. Toutes mes excuses. The organic law required in Art 102 was passed on 24 March 1992, one year after the constitution. This law was drawn up by President Bongo and his government and was ratified by Parliament where the President could count on a majority of votes. The power of the CNC was drastically restricted, as it could only present motions and give advice, which the government could completely disregard, thus leaving the President enough room to pursue his personal policy. Yet it is striking that the President abandoned his control over recruitment policy. It so happens that Art 31 stipulates that in the case of a vacancy for an executive position in the public media, the President has to select a candidate from a list of applicants drawn up by the CNC (Loi N8 14/91, 31). By this law the CNC managed to stop a presidential candidate from being appointed as executive director of the Centre National du Cinéma (CENACI) substituting the CNC's candidate, Roland Duboze, a long-time critic of the Bongo regime.
By the end of March 1992 the CNC was able to start its proceedings. In the course of 1992 the institution had already introduced a number of bills.6 The general tenor of these bills was very clear: the CNC pursued a democratic, socially aware, structurally changing media policy. The institution wanted to make access to the media easier for all political parties; it wanted to bring parliamentary democracy into the media through all kinds of programmes; and it wanted to start a social debate. Besides these bills, the CNC issued guidelines for the directors of the different media, trying to put these bills into practice. Moreover, in 1993 the CNC presented its annual report where the current situation was critically denounced and new policy guidelines were suggested (CNC 1993). Not one of the CNC initiatives, however, was dealt with or put into practice, either by the government which did not deal with one suggestion until the presidential elections at the end of 1993, or by Parliament which consisted of a majority of presidential followers, or by the state media which were still under presidential control. The permanent blocking of the Décret d'application, which should empower the CNC at least to exercise its control function, deprived it of all power. What's more, the President hindered the functioning of the institution by refusing to approve its budget. The CNC depended on government funds which barely amounted to half the anticipated budget (CNC 1993:1).
In the course of 1993 the lack of power of the CNC became strikingly obvious. The functioning of the institution was completely paralysed by a mechanism which one may suspect was intended to sideline the institution from the beginning. The vagueness of the constitution left the President and his (fraudulently or otherwise) elected Parliament the possibility of putting the CNC entirely out of action.
After the analysis of the new media in Gabon in the next paragraph we will see what the consequences of this mechanism is.
3.3 The new democratic media: distribution,contents and means
The National Conference and the subsequent new constitution produced great changes, particularly in the field of the press. The new freedom of the press and the flexible terms of payment of Multipress, the printer of Gabonese newspapers, and of Sogapresse the distributor, allowed the creation of a considerable number of new titles. By the summer of 1993 more than 40 different titles had appeared, among which only about 15 were published regularly. By means of the following table 7 we will analyse these papers, their connections with politics, their contents and their characteristics. We distinguish between genuine party newspapers (belonging either to the opposition or to the regime), newspapers affiliated to the opposition, and papers affiliated to the regime.
Almost without exception the papers created after the National Conference were political ones. The fragmentation of the opposition into small parties resulted in the fragmentation of the efforts in the field of the press. Just about every political formation had its own publication. Newspapers were distributed only in the main cities and 80 per cent of the circulation remained in the capital of Libreville. Most rural areas continued to be completely deprived of the press. With the exception of Le Bûcheron, the major opposition party's paper, reaching an average circulation of 11 600 copies, most papers merely achieved a circulation of 3 000 copies. Apart from their already limited circulation, between 20 and 50 per cent of every single title remained unsold. Because of this limited circulation, the huge number of unsold copies and the high production costs, nearly all Gabonese papers made losses, particularly the poorly selling party-linked papers. As a result most papers drew heavily on the party and its members for financial support or, like Gabon Libre, La Voix du Peuple, La Relance and Orety, on presidential candidates or leaders of the regime warming up for the coming elections.
In addition to these papers there were two opposition newspapers, which could not be considered as party papers. La Clé, affiliated to the RNB, was started clandestinely as the first opposition paper in December 1989, three months before the National Conference. It is a rather general publication and is one of the better Gabonese newspapers. Even though La Clé made an average circulation of 8 200 copies, it made a loss and had to stop publication between August 1992 and September 1993. In the mean time La Clé was published by the media group Interpresse, which also printed La Griffe, the equivalent in Gabon of the French Le Canard EnchaÑné. Although its editors claimed to be neutral, they had connections with the PGCI, the party of the paper's founder, J Okinda, presidential candidate for the PGCI. Interpresse, which published both papers, was owned by J Okinda and J P Lemboumba-Lepangou, two ex-ministers of finance and former 'cleptocrats' of the Bongo regime, who had fallen into disgrace. In their heydays, when holding power, they put aside a personal fortune which enabled them, in the democratic environment, to take a stand against the President. Not only political interests were involved, but personal feuds as well. Lemboumba, who barely escaped an attempted murder ordered by Bongo in 1992, was suspected of playing an important part in the financing of the opposition and of the opposition newspapers.
As indicated in the table above, about five titles, including La Relance, Orety and La Voix du Peuple, are related in one way or another to the current President. J B Assélé, owner and political director of Orety, is Bongo's son-in-law. With his Convention des Libéraux Réformateurs (CLR) he expresses the ideology of the liberal faction within the former single party PDG. Mayila, who owns La Voix du Peuple, is also an ex-baron of the regime and still maintains friendly relations with Bongo. Mpili and Le Couperet are satirical papers with a 'bongoistic' tendency. Their content is insulting and of the lowest kind. They embarrass the members of the opposition by publishing inside information or disclosures of suspicious activities under the one-party regime, which makes it likely that the President and his counter-intelligence department are behind these publications. These papers can be seen as the continuation of the dysfunctional communication under the single-party regime.
The content of the new Gabonese newspapers diverges strongly and therefore we distinguish three categories: papers with a more general content, those with a restricted content and the satirical ones. Papers with a more general content are publications which give the reader a general survey of current events or analyse them. This category includes La Clé, Gabon Libre, and to a lesser extent Misamu, on the side of the opposition, and Orety on the side of the regime. Although these papers belong to one of the two camps, their content goes beyond the party level as they are more general in scope. This being said, however, the main object of the opposition papers remains the defamation and criticism of the Bongo regime, without ever submitting any solutions. Nevertheless these papers seldom turn to insulting language or insinuations. As they appear only once a week, they do not constitute a valuable alternative for the daily state-owned L'Union.
Papers with a restricted content are publications whose objective is not to give the reader a general outline of the current events, but to form people's opinion. We talk about party newspapers or publications centred on certain persons, such as Le Bûcheron, Le Progressiste, La Voix du Peuple and Le Phare for the opposition, and La Relance, for the regime. Their major characteristic is that they focus their content on the party or the leader of the party. They contain almost exclusively political or politicised 8 news about Gabon and almost never deal with international news. Unfortunately, in their denunciation of the regime, they often turn to insults, insinuations, threats, etc. This can also be said about the satirical papers La Griffe and Le Scorpion, whose trustworthiness is very doubtful.
To pronounce a judgement on the content of the Gabonese press is difficult, just as it is hard to form an opinion about current affairs on the basis of that press. Maybe this says it all. The various articles about the same subject give such opposite views that it is impossible to evaluate the information.9 None of the papers presents an overall picture of actual events in the country. The lack of reliable information and constructive and alternative analyses is deplorable in the context of the democratisation. However, in this context the nearly total absence of ethnically inspired or ethnically agitating articles is noticeable and promising.
The means the new papers have at their disposal are generally inadequate. The editors have only a restricted number of permanent journalists at their disposal. Most of them are fellow party members, sympathisers or unemployed graduates of widely varying kinds and very few of them had a specific schooling in journalism. Several of the more experienced journalists are former collaborators of the national paper L'Union who either lost their jobs in 1986--1987 because of the privatisation of the paper, or who chose the side of the new press for political or economic reasons.10 In addition to the appearance of a number of opposition newspapers, the Rassemblement National des Bûcherons set up Radio Liberté early in 1993. The radio was financed by party members and broadcast for the first time on 31 March 1993. Although the transmitters were of limited capacity, the radio could be received in the entire capital, which allowed about 40 per cent of the population to follow the programmes. In no time Radio Liberté became madly popular. The content of the radio resembled the content of the opposition press. Most of the attention was given to national news discrediting the President and his regime. International news was hardly mentioned. Besides French, the programmes were successively transmitted in several native languages, such as Fang, Punu, Kota, Teke and Nzébi. The rest of the time was filled with information about the party, its planned activities and appeals from party members and interested people. Since a large part of the population was still deprived of postal services, telephone and papers, the rad)o was a much more powerful weapon for the opposition than the press.
3.4 Permanent influence of the media
The media are influenced by the regime on two levels. In the first place there is the state-owned media over which the government continues to have a controlling influence. In the second place there is the opposition media on which the regime cannot directly exercise its influence but which it tries to influence indirectly or to hinder.
During the period between the National Conference of 1990 and the presidential elections at the end of 1993, influencing the media took place through the same mechanisms as under the one-party system. Even though the possibility of direct censorship diminished, self-censorship was still an important explanatory component. Many journalists wondered whether Bongo would actually agree to leave. Most of them were waiting for the outcome of the elections and were still prepared to trade the truth for job security and career opportunities (Ndong Ngoua 1992:98). Working for the opposition press was firmly punished with dismissal or transfer to another service. The repercussions of these mechanisms on the contents remained unchanged. Just as under the one-party regime, the media remained an instrument of excessive attention for the President and the denial of everything out of line with his policy.
The effects of these practices in the new democratic context were clearly shown by the denunciation of the state media in the very critical Rapport d'Activités 1992 of the Conseil National de la Communication(CNC 1993:11). Although criticism directed against the government seemed to increase, the President and his surroundings were kept out of range (Koumba 1992:29). The CNC did not have the possibility of cutting across these practices, since it had no real power. By not dealing with the CNC motions, the government created a power vacuum to its own advantage. Although the government had to tolerate the highly critical opposition media, it continued to exercise a strong influence on the much more powerful state media.
The regime had no direct influence over the opposition newspapers. It had neither the means of manipulation it employed to influence the state media, nor could it count on the loyalty of its own press. Yet, this does not mean that the regime did not try to influence or to frighten the new opposition media. The editors of the major important opposition newspapers, such as Le Bûcheron, La Griffe, La Clé, Gabon Libre and Misamu, all mentioned intimidation or retaliation by the government. In many cases this concerned verbal threats and insults uttered by the President, members of the PDG or by the army (Amoughe 1993; Ndoutoum Eyi 1993; IOC 8 1993:36). A more often heard practice, fitting in with the 'raison d'étre' of the regime, was offering bribes or well-paid positions (Amoughe 1993; Bitheghe Minko 1993; Ndoutoum Eyi 1993). Other more violent methods of intimidation were burglary by force (Amoughe 1993; Ndoutoum Eyi 1993) or beating up or kidnapping of journalists (Amoughe 1993).
An indirect way of influencing the opposition press was to hinder it financially. Since the government held an important position on the economic markets, most enterprises refused to advertise in the opposition newspapers for fear of being denied access to the economic markets. They therefore preferred the state press or Pan-African newspapers or magazines. The majority of the Gabonese press had no publicity receipts at all, and for the papers which did attract advertisement, they constituted a minor source of income. The papers were financed either by the parties or by private persons. Out of the eleven newspapers which were not directly dependent on the PDG, six were financed by private persons. The financiers of five of those used to be associated with the regime.
This financial dependence and the affiliation with political parties formed an obstacle to the freedom of the journalists, as they constantly had to adjust the contents in accordance with the wishes of the mecenas. In many cases failure to comply with the guidelines -- read the political views of the owner -- resulted in dismissal (Koumba 1992:118). The journalist was reduced to a ghost-writer who frequently worked for papers affiliated with the existing regime and opposition papers at the same time. Only La Clé and La Griffe were allowed fairly wide editorial freedom. During the six months before the presidential elections, Omar Bongo tried to cross the opposition media in a number of less democratic ways. On 9 September 1993, the government used the alleged powerlessness of the CNC as an excuse to take action itself. The government took offence because not one newspaper of the private press complied with the stipulations of the press law of 1960 or with the law on Commercial Activities of 1989 which remained valid as long as new legislation for communication failed to appear. According to the government, it was the CNC's responsibility to ensure that these laws were obeyed, as specified in Art 2 of the law on the CNC introduced the previous year by the same government. Referring to this law, the Minister of Communication banned all private newspapers on 10 September 1993. To calm down the subsequent commotion, the Presidential Ordinance on audio-visual, cinematographic and written communication became effective on 1 October (Président de La République 1993). The intention of this law was to restrain the opposition newspapers. Art 5 stipulates -- among other things -- that the leaders of political parties or political factions could not possess or run a company in the field of communications. Solely on the basis of this article the government could suppress half of the private press. Art 8 and 37 contained complicated registration procedures which could cost the papers months of time and heaps of bribes, since bureaucracy was certainly hostile to them. But most offensive was Art 43 which specified that every paper was obliged to submit a specimen, signed by the director of each publication, to the prosecutor. It goes without saying that measures of this kind would lead to preventive censorship in no time. Consequently the opposition turned down the Ordinance and brought the case before the Cour Constitutionelle which decided in favour of the opposition all along the line (Cour Constitutionelle 1993). On 6 November opposition papers reappeared after having disappeared from the market for two months.
There was no unequivocal answer to the question of what the Presidential Ordinance means for the democratisation process. The contempt for the CNC and its policy proposals was a serious denial of this democratic institution. Furthermore, obstructing its policy amounted to delaying the democratisation process. On the other hand, declaring a number of articles of a Presidential Ordinance unconstitutional was an important exception in an African context. At that stage the omnipotence of the President seemed to be politically restrained. He found himself facing a critical CNC whose policy he could cross but whose members he could not discharge and a Cour Constitutionelle which could take the edges off his dictatorial actions but whose members he could not dismiss either. The result, however, remained a legislative vacuum which consolidated the status quo. A similar conflict broke out between the CNC and the Minister of Communication. Although the CNC had granted Radio Liberté a broadcasting licence (CNC, 1993, N82/93/CNC) the minister contested the CNC's authority to deliver licences. According to the Minister, the CNC had only a moral qualification and on 9 April 1993 he forbade further transmission. The CNC partly followed the Minister and ordered the radio to restrict its programmes to trial broadcasts presenting only music. The Radio, however, disregarded the decision and continued to transmit. Although the government did not interfere officially, it probably did so through other channels. From the very beginning strong transmitters caused interference with Radio Liberté which made it very hard to follow the programmes. Transmitters and receivers had to change frequency all the time. On 22 February 1994, after the presidential elections and the re-election of Omar Bongo, and after several days of general strike called by Radio Liberté, the buildings of the radio were ransacked and the transmitting equipment was blown up during an early morning raid (IOC 1994:37). Radio, in contrast to the press, apparently turned out to be too powerful a weapon in the hands of the opposition.
4 CONCLUSION
Without doubt the pressure for democratic changes at the beginning of 1990 was the expression of growing social dissatisfaction. Although the regime gave way to changes, its philosophy was to keep these as few as possible. The outcome of the National Conference and the subsequent democratisation, however, went far beyond what it had expected. The period after the National Conference then has to be seen in the light of a destabilised system in which different groups fought over state power. As these groups were not supported by large segments of the population the fight for media and access to the media was hard, as this was the only way to reach their potential following.
Broadly speaking three groups can be distinguished: a democratic group trying to change the existing system; a group consisting of the old elite, headed by the President, trying to hold on to power by turning back the democratisation process; and a group of politically conscious elite who had been left out of power, and for whom the transition to the multi-party system was a legitimate means of gaining access to the system.
The characteristics of the Gabonese media after the National Conference were an expression of the evolution in the political field. At the end of 1993 only a few media such as Radio Liberté, Le Bûcheron, Misamu and Le Progressiste were affiliated with genuine democratic opposition parties. The content of these media was focused mainly on party news, as this was the only channel to reach their following. Because of limited circulation, high production costs and no or little advertising most of these media were loss-making. Their continued existence over a longer period therefore became questionable.
In contrast to the limited means of the opposition, the President had access to a wide range of media. As Omar Bongo had been able to keep control over the state media, content had not changed drastically. Although the media had become more critical, the President could still rely on the loyalty of the state media. His obstruction of the CNC and its proposals certainly was a way of securing the status quo in his own interest. Analysing the problems of the CNC one could even wonder if the Constitution, drawn up under the President after the National Conference, did not deliberately leave space for different interpretations. Except for the official media, Bongo and his PDG could rely on different newspapers reflecting their policies.
Apart from the newspapers and the media affiliated with genuine opposition parties, and the media immediately affiliated or influenced by the President, a lot of the private newspapers were financed by private persons, all former top ranking officials. The existence of these newspapers can only be understood in the light of the principle that political power leads to economic accumulation, and as already stated when democratic methods are adopted, wealth becomes a conditio sine qua non for access to power (Médard 1991c:346). These people tried to become popular, sometimes only in their ethnic group, in order to be elected themselves as president, or to be in a position where they could be co-opted for the sake of political and ethnical stability. The press was thereby seen as an important tool to reach sufficient popularity.
|
|
|
Alerte | IP |
Format d'impression | Modifier |
Répondre |
Répondre avec citation | Haut |
|
|
newsman
Membre doyen
Auteur de: 25 messages sur ce forum, Evaluez ce membre |
19-juin-00, 18h59 (Heure de: New Jersey) |
|
|
2. "Suite et fin"
En réponse au message #1
| |
The re-election of Omar Bongo in December 1993, be it fraudulent or democratic, clearly shows his lasting power and his determination to stay. And although newspapers of all kinds still appear, the destructive raid on Radio Liberté, the only opposition medium with any real impact, shows that the freedom of the press remains non-existent. Notes:
At the end of 1973 Albert Bernard Bongo converted to Islam and took the name of El Hadj Omar Bongo.
This term is used, for instance, by Médard. The term patrimonialism was originally used by Max Weber.
Médard talks about more or less livable regimes, which, according to the author, does not mean that such regimes are acceptable. For a comment on different types of authoritarian regimes see Médard 1991c.
André-Jean Tudesq is professor in media studies and history at the Michel de Montaigne university in Bordeaux, France. He is the author of: Tudesq A J 1989, L'Afrique Noire et ses télévisions. Paris: Anthropos INA.
|
|
|
Alerte | IP |
Format d'impression | Modifier |
Répondre |
Répondre avec citation | Haut |
|
|
|